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COMMENTS
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
POLICY
GEORGE M. SMERIt
Within the past half century the United States has become a pre-
dominantly urbanized nation. As a result, the focus of national interest
and the physical site of national problems has become increasingly
urban.' Because national interest was absorbed by the Depression and
World War II, however, it was not until the late 1950's that the people
of the United States began to realize what had been developing in the
urban areas. Up to that point, serious difficulties had been mounting
virtually unchecked.
Life in the troubled metropolitan areas is more tolerable, even ii
population density is relatively high, if physical movement and access
to economic, cultural and social activities is easy, fast and inexpensive.
One of the primary concomitants of rapid urbanization, however, is
congestion in transportation. This symptom is particularly visible in the
crush of automative traffic at certain times of day. Although construc-
tion of expensive highways may relieve automotive congestion, con-
sideration of alternative uses for highway construction funds may lead
one to conclude that increased automotive mobility is dearly acquired in
terms of foregone opportunity costs.
Other less obvious aspects of immobility may be even more insidious
to urban well-being than the traffic jam. In most American cities, public
mass transportation service may be described charitably as only fifth
rate. Mass transportation currently offers a poor alternative to the auto-
mobile in terms of frequency, convenience and general access to the
activity of the community. Those who do not have access to an automo-
bile, typically the very young, the elderly, the poor, the handicapped and
the suburban housewife in a one-car family, are virtual prisoners, isolated
from the opportunities of the urban area. Unempolyment, under-
employment, frustration, enforced idleness and loneliness are products of
this immobility. Such burdens on the human spirit are probably far
'I Professor of Transportation, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1. In 1900 only forty per cent of the population was considered to be urbanized by
the Census Bureau, and by 1920, the fifty per cent mark was passed. In the 1940 census,
persons living in urban areas amounted to 56.5 per cent of total population, and the figure
soared to over 67 per cent by 1960. The rapid growth in urbanization is expected to
continue so that by 1980 the population of the country should exceed 225 million with
eighty per cent urbanized.
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more serious barriers to urban well-being than the traffic jam.
Congestion, of course, is not new to cities. Rome, for example, had
traffic problems of awesome proportion during the period of the Empire.
In the past, however, advancing technology seemed to save the day at the
critical moment. The horsedrawn streetcar, which could move more
people faster than the omnibus, helped alleviate the congestion of
omnibus traffic. The electric streetcar was capable of moving even more
people with considerably greater dispatch than the horsecars. In certain
cities elevated and underground railroads provided a private right-of-way
for high capacity rapid transit trains at a time when street traffic
threatened to grind to a halt. The developments in public transport
managed, however inelegantly, to make relatively intensive use of
limited urban space and to provide mobility to the entire city at a
compartively low cost.
Presently, however, automotive congestion seems to be much more
difficult to eradicate at a reasonable cost. Since the end of the Second
World War, large sums of money have been spent to improve highways
in urban areas. At best, these new roads appear to have provided only
temporary relief from congestion. At worst, they have added to traffic
problems by enticing more cars into already congested areas. In addition,
failure to provide adequate parking space in highway construction plans
has led to parking problems of great magnitude. Congestion, by stealing
vitality, amenity, pure air and time has caused cities to become less
attractive and more costly places to which to live and transact business.
Thus, congestion is a force which weakens and debilitates the city. In
an urbanized society like the United States, whatever weakens the city
the economy and society as a whole. Hence, eradicating congestion from
American cities is a matter of great concern and importance.
CAUSES OF THE URBAN TRANSPORT PROBLEM
While the urban transport problem of congestion is often blamed
solely upon the automobile, a closer evaluation of the situation reveals a
more complex chain of factors and events. One of the most critical
elements of the transportation congestion problem has been the increasing
tendency of the urban population to move away from the core area of the
city into suburbia. As a consequence, despite a recent trend toward an
increasing number of multiple-family dwellings in the suburbs, density
per square mile tends to be quite low in comparison with the central
city. The move outward from the city into the suburban or outer ring
portion of metropolitan areas has been made possible largely by the
automobile. The result has been to gear life to Henry Ford's invention.
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This is a particularly critical problem because the shift of population to
the outlying areas has reached tidal wave proportions.' When mass
movement of the population occurs in a relatively short time period and
within a relatively small space, such as the downtown core of a metro-
politan area, a traffic jam is inevitable.
That portion of the metropolitan population living in the outer
fringe area is difficult to serve by any form of transportation other than
the automobile. Population density is so low, relative to the older part
of the city, that under conventional procedures it is difficult to establish
a bus line that provides efficient and acceptable service at reasonable
fares while still providing the operator a profit. Consequently, in the
outer part of most metropolitan areas public transportation service, if
any exists, is often confined to a few trips per day during peak periods.'
Another major cause of transport problems in urban areas is the
decline of public transport as an effective alternative to the use of the
automobile. The decline of the transit industry began toward the end of
the nineteenth century, primarily as a result of financial chicanery and
excess capitalization which seriously weakened the industry. Added to
the burden of excess capitalization in the transit industry were the require-
ments imposed upon street railways by the communities in which they
operated. A franchise was usually required for the use of the public
streets and among the usual provisions of the franchise were requirements
for street and bridge maintenance, sprinkling the streets against dust
in the summer and clearing the streets of snow in the winters. Most
burdensome, perhaps, was that many franchises set the maximum
fare that might be charged at a nickel.4
2. POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES By TYPE OF RESIDENCE, 1950 AND 1960
Increase, 1950-60, in
Area 1950 1960 Number Per Cent
Total United States 151,326,000 179,323,000 27,997,000 18.5
Standard Metropolitan Areas 89,317,000 112,885,000 23,568,000 26.4
Central Cities 52,371,000 58,004,000 5,633,000 10.8
Outside Central Cities 36,945,000 54,881,000 17,935,000 48.5
Other Territory 62,009,000 66,438,000 4,429,000 7.1
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, NUMBER
OF INHABITANTS xxvi, 1-3.
3. Some interesting thoughts on urban population shifts and the need for improved
mass transportation to meet the needs of rapidly growing suburban areas may be found
in Conway, 1950-1960 Popldation Shift Poses Transportation Problem, 15 TRAFFIc Q. 62
(1961) and Conway, Rapid Transit Must be Improved to Alleviate Traffic Congestion, 16
TRaAxic Q. 103 (1962).
4. Neither the franchise requirements nor the relatively high debt capitalization
were overly troublesome during most of the period of declining prices between the end
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During the 1920's, when a great deal of money was spent by all
units of government on construction and improvement of highways, the
transit industry began to feel the competition from automobiles.
In fact, the dark days of the Depression spelled financial ruin for
many transit firms. Replacement of streetcars with buses did ease the
burden of fixed costs. However, most transit firms were so weakened
by the events of the past that they were unable to provide either the
equipment or service that was attractive to the increasing number of
Americans who could afford to own and drive a car.
Another factor aiding the demise of mass transport was the caliber
of management in the industry. For a variety of reasons, transit manage-
ment is, typically, operations oriented. The vital spark of marketing-
understanding consumer needs and meeting those needs-is usually
missing. The thrust of management efforts is usually marked by a
relatively indifferent, unrealistic or impractical attitude toward maintain-
ing or increasing demand. In other words, if revenues decline or profit
margins shrink, the usual reaction of management is to cut costs,
usually by reducing service, and at the same time raise fares. Neither of
these techniques encourage people to use transit systems."
Factors influencing the failure of commuter railroads are slightly
different, but the result has been almost the same. *Most rail commuter
operations started many years ago as by-products of through passenger
service offered at specially reduced or commuted fares. As demand for
such service grew with the expanding city, however, suburban operations
expanded to the extent that they were often a completely separate
operation from through train service. Nevertheless the low fares con-
tinued and often many years passed before any substantial increase in
fares was permitted to bring revenue into some practical relationship
with cost. With increasing automotive competition the commuter railways
and the local transit companies both were faced with a sharply increased
demand for their services at the rush hours with little demand at other
times. Expensive, specialized equipment, manpower and plant facilities
were fully utilized for only about four hours each weekday. As was the
case with transit, many commuter railways curtailed service drastically
to cut costs. New equipment purchases were often out of the question.
of the Civil War and the turn of the century. However, around 1900 prices began to
move upward with the pyramiding of transit companies into citywide monopolies greatly
inflating the debt capital. The five-cent fare proved insufficient. Even before the auto-
mobile arrived on the scene, many public transit firms were in shaky financial condition.
5. See L. SCHNEIDER, MARKETING URBAN MAss TRANSIT 33-34 (1965); Smerk,
Federal Urban Transport Policy: Where Do We Go From Heref, 21 TRAFFIC Q. 29, 47-
50 (1967).
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In Philadelphia, for example, commuters on Penn Central suburban
lines ride in the same equipment their grandparents rode; the cars are
fifty to sixty years old.
Although the tire, gas and auto shortages during the Second World
War revived the patronage of all mass transport modes, this demand was
to last only until automobiles once again became plentiful. By the middle
1950's the service on most mass transport operations was poor, the
equipment often abominable, the convenience minimal, and potential
customers were not utilizing the systems.' As the decade wore on and
congestion grew worse, it became clear to some observers that the
nearly complete dependence upon the automobile for urban transporta-
tion was, to say the least, unwise. Less use of private automobiles and
increased use of mass transportation began to make a great deal of
sense. Such a change was unlikely, however, as long as aid from the
federal government was limited to the construction of highways. With-
out federal aid, public transportation became shabbier, less attractive
and generally unable to generate revenues sufficient even to buy new
buses.
SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO URBAN PROBLEMS
By the middle of the 1950's a dispersed form of urban development
had become quite dear. The growth in the number and use of cars, made
almost mandatory in this dispersed city form increased automotive
congestion. The American aversion to comprehensive urban planning
practically guaranteed that the rosy post-war dream of door-to-door
travel convenience upon congestion-free highways would not materialize.
The only practical answer in a society whose transport was dominated
by the private automobile seemed to lie in the construction of more,
bigger and better highways. Real solutions to traffic congestion in the
United States, therefore, proved to be most elusive.
Indeed, for ease of solution, problems could find no worse place to
focus than in the metropolitan areas. It was becoming painfully obvious
that as the problems grew more complex, there was no effective unit of
governmental authority at the local level that could deal with metro-
politan problems.7 As suburban development in areas surrounding
6. For a more complete coverage of this decline see LYLE C. FITCH & ASSOCIATES,
URBAN TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 37-54 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FITCH];
W. OWEN, THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM, ch. III (rev. ed. 1956);
G. SMERX, URBAN TRANSPORTATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE, 43-54 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as SMERXu].
7. See NEW YORK COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT TO SECURE A BALANCED FEDERALISM (1966) for a most interesting analysis of
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established central cities began to increase, the tendency was for each of
the suburban areas to maintain its political and fiscal individuality, even
though close social and economic ties with the central city remained.
State laws generally made annexation difficult. Moreover, most suburbs,
whose residents were anxious to escape the problems of the central city,
fiercely resisted any overtures from the central city for political union.
The result of this attitude was the establishment of a vast number of
political subdivisions with differing financial needs and resources. Con-
sequently, when a problem such as transportation, which affects an
entire metropolitan community without respect to artificial political
boundaries, becomes serious, it is difficult to marshal any broad metro-
politan approach to its solution.' In such a situation outside help,
either from the state or federal government, is the only course of
action tolerable to the metropolitan community as a whole. The un-
willingness or inability of state governments to take effective action
eventually makes the search for solutions of many metropolitan pro-
blems the responsibility of the federal government.'
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN URBAN TRANSPORT
Federal action for support of urban mass transportation did not
come about easily. Initially, there was a lack of broad, grass-roots
support. In large part this was due to public apathy throughout much
of the country. As is true in most nations, United States citizens must
be confronted with a crisis before they demand action from their legis-
lators. "Moreover, there must be strong pressure group support, before
Congress will overcome its natural hesitance to move into new ground.'
Additionally, persons in the political world generally must perceive some
political advantage in becoming spokesmen for a new cause.
On the other hand, opposition to new fields of federal action is not
hard to generate. There are always existing interests and pressure groups,
the problem. This study suggests strengthening county government as a possible means
of better serving the needs of the metropolitan areas.
8. Adding to the common difficulty created by the disparity of needs and resources
of segmented communities within a given metropolitan area is the fear of each segment
that it will pay more than it will benefit from any proposed metropolitan plan. More-
over, there is a general feeling on the part of the various suburban units that the central
city is the only real beneficiary of metropolitanwide programs. See, e.g., J. Dow, METRO-
POLITAN TRANSPORTATION POLITICS AND THE NEW YORK REGION 42-43, 96, 146-48 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as DOIG].
9. For a more complete discussion of fragmentation, see M. DANIELSON, FEDERAL-
METROPOLITAN POLITICS AND THE COMMUTER CRISIS, ch. IV (1965) [hereinafter cited as
DANIELSON]; FITCH, supra note 6, at 15-18; SMERK, supra note 6, 82-118.
10. See R. MONSEN & M. CANNON, THE MAKERS OF PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POWER GROUPS AND THEIR IDEOLOGIES 1-23 (1965).
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the so-called "highway lobby" in the case of federal aid for transit, that
feel threatened by proposed programs. Furthermore, since urban mass
transportation seems to be a very local problem, many members of
Congress would be reluctant to involve the federal government in such
a purely local affair. There is also the usual unhappiness of the public
with programs administered by unfeeling bureaucrats far from the
actual site of the problem. When combined with public reluctance to
support programs in which federal tax dollars seem to be used only to
solve others' problems, the antifederal feeling is an inevitable source of
opposition.
THE C isis OF 1958
Federal activity in behalf of urban mass transportation was the result
of a crisis situation in 1958.11 Oddly enough, the crisis arose inadvertent-
11. Prior to 1958 some cities did show interest in the problems of congestion and
deteriorating mass transportation and tried to take steps toward a solution. Perhaps
most notable were the efforts of Philadelphia and San Francisco. In the mid-fifties
Philadelphia sought federal aid for transit capital improvements after being rebuffed in
its efforts to secure aid from surrounding suburban counties and state government. Con-
gress likewise failed to respond. DANIELSON, supra note 9, presents a valuable and com-
plete source of information on the events leading up to the beginning of federal participa-
tion in urba nmass transportation programs. Much of what follows is indebted to
Danielson's work for its thought and spirit.
Rapid population growth and the automotive explosion after the Second World War
made an already troublesome transport problem more abrasive than ever in San Francisco.
The California Legislature responded to county pressue by creating the San Francisco
Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission in 1951 and granting three-quarters of a million
dollars to study the problem. In 1957, again at the request of the Bay Area counties, the
state created the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District to do developmental
and planning work, but no effort to obtain federal funds was evident at that time.
Other cities made spasmodic attempts to cope with rising urban transportation prob-
lems but did not go much beyond the generation of primarily highway-oriented plans.
Those conducting the studies can hardly be blamed. It was simply unimaginable that
mass transportation in its derelict state could ever hope to attract an increasing share
of patronage.
Furthermore, there was no power or pressure group representing the mass trans-
portation viewpoint, for most cities had no particular position on what should be done
about mass transportation. As individual entities their actions had often done more to
hinder effective mass transportation service than to help it. Planners, downtown busi-
ness interests, labor groups, civic interest groups and various academic types were dis-
interested or unable to take any sort of concerted position on transit--often because all
concern was focused on the highway development programs. The position taken by the
railroads was to reduce their passenger service losses, usually through discontinuation of
unprofitable services. The American Transit Association, the transit industry trade
organization, was primarily a statistical and information service for its members rather
than a lobbying instrument. The industry lacked the strong power position necessary to
secure important measures from Congress.
In short, by the end of 1957 little had been done to interest the federal government
in aiding mass transportation, with the exception of Philadelphia's futile effort. If there
was any opinion on the matter in Washington, it was that urban mass transportation prob-
lems were strictly a local affair and should be handled on the local level.
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ly as Congress strove to provide some legislative relief for the nation's
railroads. The Depression of the 1930's had hurt the railroads as it had
most business, but wartime traffic had greatly stimulated revenues and
profits. After the vicissitudes of the preceding fifteen years, the postwar
attitude of American railroads was one of optimism. By the early 1950's,
however, it was quite evident that although there was a great rise in
freight movement and travel, this upsurge was not by rail. Increasing
numbers of people traveled by automobile, and the air transportation
business began an almost explosive period of growth while passenger
traffic on railroads was decreasing. Freight transportation profits had
always permitted the railways to maintain passenger operations. How-
ever, even freight revenues began to decrease, largely because of the
inroads of competing modes of transport, particularly trucking. The
spasmodic economy of the fifties also hurt rail earnings because when
business is general is bad, it is usually very bad for the railroads. Both
the fitful behavior of the economy and shrinking profits spurred the
railroads to seek legislative relief. One of the prime needs, from the
railroads' viewpoint, was relief from the obligation to carry passengers.
In 1957 alone the railroads had considerable reason to be concerned
about passenger service. The losses from this service, according to the
Interstate Commerce Commission totaled 723.7 million dollars.' 2
Congress finally provided some relief from this distress in the
Transportation Act of 1958.1" One of the Act's provisions dealt with
the problems faced by the railroads in attempting to relieve themselves
of the burdens of unremunerative passenger transportation.14 Under the
12. The exact losses from passenger operations are a debatable issue. The 723.7
million dollar figure represents the result of the ICC's method of fully apportioned costs.
On the basis of solely related costs, the deficit for 1957 was in the neighborhood of 114
million dollars. See Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 I.C.C. 419-25, 486 (1959);
AsS'N OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, BUREAU OF RAILWAY ECONOMICS, STATISTICS OF RAIL-
ROAD PASSENGER SERVICE 9 (1966); AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, AVOIDABLE
COSTS OF PASSENGER TRAIN SERVICE (1957).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). For a brief recapitulation of the contents of this act, see
D. LOCKLIN, EcoNOMlIcs OF TRANSPORTATION 254-58 (6th ed. 1966).
14. Prior to the passage of this act, discontinuance of passenger train service re-
quired action by the state regulatory commission; ICC jurisdiction was involved only
upon abandonment of a line. From long experience the railroads had learned that gain-
ing permission from state bodies was typically time consuming and expensive. Sections
13a(1) and (2) of the 1958 act were aimed at remedying the situation.
Under section 13a(1), enacted in 1958, railroads desiring to discontinue or
change the operation or service of any train operating between points in two or
more States, but whose right to do so is governed by State laws, may elect to
file a notice with the Commission of their intent to make the discontinuance or
change, and 30 days thereafter, put it into effect regardless of State laws or
decision to the contrary, unless, within that time, the Commission enters upon
an investigation of the proposal. If it does so, it may order the operation or
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terms of the new law, interstate passenger service can be withdrawn
quickly after the proper notice is given, unless, of course, the ICC
investigates and requires the service to be continued. To discontinue
passenger service of an intrastate nature the carrier is first required to
seek relief from state agencies. After that course of action has been
exhausted under the terms of the law, the carrier can petition the ICC.
After passage of the 1958 Act, the railroads were generally in a much
better position to remove the passenger millstone from their necks.1 5
All commuter service was vulnerable under the Act, but especially
that of the New York City region that was interstate in nature. The
Transportation Act of 1958 was signed into law by President Eisen-
hower on August 12, 1958; on that very day the New York Central
Railroad posted notices announcing that it would discontinue its West
Shore Ferry service linking Manhattan with the New York Central
commuter railway operation on the west side of the Hudson River. The
Erie Railroad shortly followed suit. The ICC did not investigate the
action proposed by the New York Central, and thirty days later the
ferry boats stopped running.
Throughout the autumn of 1958, the New York area commuter
railroads announced large deficits, and at the beginning of December
the Lehigh Valley and Delaware, Lackawanna & Western railroads
announced plans for abandonment of commuter service. The Pennsy-
lvania Railroad stated that it would discontinue most off-peak commuter
service to Manhattan. Railroads in other, parts of the country made
service continued for not exceeding 4 months pending a decision in the investi-
gation, at which time, provided it makes the required statutory findings, the
Commission may require continuance (or restoration) of the service for not
more than 1 year thereafter. If it decided not to enter upon an investigation,
or if the Commission fails to decide the case within the 4-month period, the car-
rier may discontinue or change the service as proposed. Under section 13a(2),
where the proposed discontinuance or change in service of a train operated
wholly within a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of that
State, or where the State authority having jurisdiction has denied an application
or petition or has not acted finally on such application or petition within 120
days from their presentation, the carrier may file an application with the Com-
mission for authority to effect the discontinuance or change. The Commission
may authorize it only after notice and hearing and upon prescribed findings.
75 ICC ANN. REP. 72 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley R.R. Discontinuance of Service, All Passenger Opera-
tions, 307 I.C.C. 239 (1959) ; 307 I.C.C. 257 (1959) ; 312 I.C.C. 399 (1961) ; Pennsyl-
vania R.R. Discontinuance of Passenger Service Between Trenton and Red Bank, NJ.,
317 I.C.C. 5 (1961) ; New Jersey & N.Y.R.R. (Horace Banta, Trustee) Discontinuance
of Service from Hoboken, N.J., to Spring Valley, N.Y., 307 I.C.C. 532 (1959) ; New
York Cent. R.R. Discontinuance of Service, St. Lawrence Div., 312 I.C.C. 4 (1960);
Pennsylvania R.R. Discontinuance of Service Between Camden and Trenton, N.J., 312
I.C.C. 167 (1960).
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similar threats. It soon became clear that the legislation that had been
aimed at helping the railroads had suddenly become the vehicle by which
the urban mass transportation problem reached a critical stage. 6
The threat to commuter service brought alarm from the older and
larger cities. In the New York City area attempts were made to join with
New Jersey and Connecticut to find some way to retain railway service.
In Philadelphia, the city formed a nonprofit corporation, the Passenger
Service Improvement Corporation, whose purpose was to lease improved
service at reduced fares from the Reading and Pennsylvania railroads."7
Gradually it became clear to the worried big cities that they must
take action to solve their mass transportation problems. The cities had
been unable to help themselves, and state governments had proved unable
to act effectively. In short, the federal government, which had inadvertent-
ly touched off the urban transportation crisis, appeared to be the best
place to look for solutions. The atmosphere in Washington, however,
could hardly have been more hostile to any increase in the federal
presence in metropolitan areas. President Eisenhower wished to keep
federal involvement in cities and local areas as low as possible. More-
over, the Administration was fully committed to the highway program.
In addition, it was likely that the powerful highway interest groups
would take a dim view of any mass transport programs, especially if it
appeared that highway money might be diverted.
The position of the Eisenhower Administration in regard to urban
transportation problems was clearly set in Federal Transportation
Policy and Program, issued- by the Commerce Department in March,
1960.8 Beneath the usual bureaucratic language of this policy state-
16. DANIELSON, supra note 9, 47-52. See also Dow, supra note 8, ch. 9; A.E. Alt-
shuler, The Politics of Urban Mass Transportation 17-21, Sept. 4-7, 1963 (mimeographed
speech delivered at the 1963 annual meeting of the American Political Science Ass'n)
[hereinafter cited as Altshuler].
17. For more information on the Passenger Service Improvement Corp. of Philadel-
phia, see Institute for Rapid Transit, News Letter, Mar. 30, 1962. For activities in the
New Jersey and New York area see DOIG, supra note 8, chs. 8-9; J. BEBOUT & R. GRELE,
WHERE CITIES MEET: THE UR3ANIZATION OF NEW JERSEY, 73-74 (1964).
18. Metropolitan areas are increasingly congested with mass highway trans-
portation, and are afflicted by rush-hour jams, parking area deficiencies, and
commuter and rapid-transit losses.
This is primarily a local problem. But the Federal Government contributes
toward the problem with its huge highway program. It also has a deep concern
in the railroad commutation passenger losses because of their effects upon the
health of the railroad system and upon the extent to which the Nation can secure
the benefit of the railroads' capability for mass long-distance transport of
freight. Ways and means must also be found to encourage tax relief by local
and State jurisdictions in helping solve the problems of commuter or local
passenger deficits.
The Federal Government should encourage communities to make broad
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ment, it was clea'r that the Administration felt that the federal govern-
ment should not involve itself directly in the urban transport problem.
This particular position, as well as many others embodied in the report,
did not, however, coincide with the thinking of a number of staff
members who had performed the background work. 9 Their position on
urban transportation is of considerable interest because it pointed to the
folly of federal support for highways only and called for federal support
of mass transit as well as highways."0
In light of the attitude of the Administration in the late 1950's,
it is not surprising that Washington was not prepared to investigate or
administer a program to aid mass transport for urban areas. Responsi-
bility was scattered among various agencies and departments. It appeared
that the federal government was ill-adapted organizationally to handle
the problems of urban transportation through established policies and
programs. It was also abundantly clear, at least to some observers, that
it was not even well prepared to formulate objectives and policies for
nonurban transport. Perhaps the greatest difficulty was that mass trans-
portation problems, particularly when narrowly viewed as mainly a
commuter railway problem, had small appeal in Congress. It seemed to
land-use plans with transportation as an essential part. It should consider as a
long-run problem means by which such forward planning can be encouraged.
It should also consider possible community charges on highway gateways and
parking areas to help reduce the highway congestion and help finance the
over-all transportation plan. Jointly with communities, the Federal authorities
should consider the total urban transport situation so that Federal participation
may contribute to the efficiency with which urban transport as a whole is per-
formed.
D e'T OF COrMMERcE. FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND PROGRAA 7 (1960).
19. DEP'T OF COMERCE, RATIONALE OF FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY III
(1960).
20. Downtown areas were not designed to handle the traffic load which re-
sults from . . . (population) dispersion and the accompanying reliance upon
the private automobile. The two major past and continuing trends are the
resulting decline in business activity in the heart of the central city, and a sharp
reduction in the use of public transportation facilities.
From the standpoint of total cost, serious problems are raised by these
trends. Mass transportation is clearly much less expensive per passenger-mile
than total costs of the private automobile with an average of less than two oc-
cupants. From the standpoint of efficiency, there is little doubt that per pas-
senger . . . transit vehicles are far more efficient in terms of space occupied...
Rail lines are similarly much better space users.
The present highway program has provided substantial sums for improving
access to our major metropolitan areas. However, the present program does
not require any test to determine the most efficient use. of these funds in terms
of passenger movement. Merely adding highways which will attract more
automobiles which will in turn require more highways is no solution to the
problems of urban development.
Id. at 52.
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be a problem affecting only a very limited number of larger cities and
simply did not seem to promise much political mileage."
REACTION TO THE CRISIS
Despite the infelicity of the atmosphere for federal action on the
mass transportation issue in 1958, work was begun almost immediately
to rectify the problems created by the threatened discontinuation of
commuter railway service. The support for action which eventually led
to federal legislative programs came from the central cities, not from
the states or the suburban areas. It is not surprising that the dominating
force should be the central city. Suburban areas are principally
occupied with local problems; therefore, such communities are poorly
equipped even to consider action that might include cooperation with
bodies outside their jurisdiction. So suspicious are the suburbs of threaten-
ed loss of autonomy that the reaction to any proposal to band together
with other suburban or central city governmental bodies is almost univer-
sally one of hostility.
Suburban efforts in dealing with the federal government tend to be
sporadic. Admittedly, from the rather narrow suburban viewpoint, it is
difficult to recognize the entire problem that affects metropolitan area.
The envisioned programs or federal aid are invariably aimed at short-
run solutions to very local aspects of a problem. As a result, outcries
from suburban areas in danger of losing their commuter service were
limited to pleas for the continuation of service on their particular line.
The attitude of the states in regard to expand federal programs in
urban areas is often negative. It is not unusual for the rural elements in
state legislatures to harbor resentment and antipathy for urbanites. 2
There is, moreover, considerable fear that any sort of regional authority
or federally sponsored regional action may not only be harmful to state
prestige and sovereignty, but may cause the state government to become
financially entangled. In short, states often view direct federal aid pro-
grams as a threat, and therefore give little or no support to plans for
federal action in urban areas. This attitude may soften, however, if the
state is given the role of an intermediary in parceling out federal aid.
It is the central city, therefore, with its onerous burdens of slums,
crime, eroding tax base, rape by highway, upperclass diaspora and
lower class in-migration that carries the message to Washington. In
undertaking the task of gaining federal support for urban programs, the
21. See DANIELSON, supra note 9. at 25-27.
22. See SmERK, supra note 6, at 99-113.
URBAN TRANSPORTATION POLICY
big cities had certain invaluable resources, including prominent, power-
ful and practical men in politics and business and national urban lobbying
groups, like the American Municipal Association (now called the
National League of Cities) and the United States Conference of Mayors.
The large metropolitan newspapers which often include nationally
syndicated columnists on their staffs, provided another resource, not to
be discounted lightly. Added to these resources was the superior per-
spective of the central city as the focus of regional problems and strengths.
While events or problems might be felt only subtly in the suburban
ring, each tug of the metropolitan spider web was felt at the center.
As urban problems mounted on various issues, an alliance of interest
groups was formed. In the initial stages this alliance usually consisted
of Democratic politicians, the downtown economic interests and some
of the large metropolitan dailies. Regional civic groups were soon added
to this force, along with labor groups, planners and even college pro-
fessors who saw the light outside their towers. In the transportation
area, the commuter railroads and transit operators were added to this
group.
23
Every movement needs a champion. In the early stages of the
development of the federal policy for urban mass transportation, that
man was Richardson Dilworth, Democratic mayor of Philadelphia. Not
daunted by the earlier failure to gain federal aid, Dilworth and other
representatives of the central cities and the railroads met in Chicago in
January, 1959 to assess the situation in the wake of the Transportation
Act of 1958.24 Among the city representatives and the eastern commuter
railroads there soon developed a consensus that the federal government
had a role to play. The western commuter roads, perhaps less desperate
than their eastern brethren, were coy about any federal intervention.
The bugaboo of subsidy leading eventually to a federal takeover of the
railroads was raised.25 The meeting was not a failure, however, and
a smaller working committee headed by Dilworth began developing a
plan that all interests could support.
The working committee met in Philadelphia in March, 1959. In
23. For a more detailed treatment of this analysis, see DANIELSON, supra note 9, at
183-89.
24. Attending the conference were representatives of Allentown, Pa., Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, New York, Philadelphia,
St. Louis and Washington, D.C. The railroads represented were the Baltimore & Ohio,
Boston & Maine, Burlington, Milwaukee Road, Chicago & North Western, Pennsylvania,
New York Central, Jersey Central, Rock Island, Southern Pacific, Reading, Erie, Lacka-
wanna, Long Island, Missouri Pacific and New Haven.
25. DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 101-03.
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order to gain more time for agreement, as well as to put together some
factual basis for their case, a study was undertaken. The work was
completed by the committee and a report entitled The Collapse of
Commuter Service was issued by the American Municipal Association
near the end of 1959. The report was based on a study of five cities with
commuter rail or rapid transit systems: New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, Cleveland and Chicago. National alarm was raised over the
following finding of the report:
The vast importance of the problem of mass transportation is
indicated by the fact that more than 60% of the total U.S.
population is contained in the Standard Metropolitan Areas,
and by the end of the next decade, almost 80% of the U.S.
population will be located in these areas.
The need for continuation of commuter rail and rapid transit service was
sharply pointed out to the cost-conscious:
If only twenty-five per cent of those now riding mass trans-
portation lines were to be forced onto the highways . . . it
would cost these five cities $4.4 billion to provide the highway
capacity to move a comparable number of people. . . . If the
commuter lines were to suspend operations completely, it would
cost $17.4 billion to build highways to serve a comparable
number of people in these five cities. This does not include
the additional costs of constructing parking facilities, the loss
in taxes or the cost of traffic engineering.... "
In addition, a suggestion that a federal lending corporation be established
to provide funds for urban transportation programs was also included."
The Collapse of Commuter Service and persistent efforts by Dil-
worth and his commuter rail allies at the American Municipal Associa-
tion Congress in December, 1959, brought full AMA recognition of the
problem. The association adopted a resolution calling on Congress to
establish a policy that would promote coordinated transport on all levels.
Congress was also asked to provide long-term, low interest loans for the
purchase of new equipment or the upgrading of facilities. The issue of
federal grants-in-aid was more problematic. Therefore, only a recom-
mendation was made that a study of such a program be undertaken.28
It was, however, difficult to muster a great deal of general enthusi-
26. AmERICAN MUNICIPAL ASS'N, THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUTER SERVICE 2 (1959).
27. Id. at 3.
28. DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 104-05.
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asm for a program that was narrowly focused on rail commuter and
rapid transit problems. The number of concerned cities with such
facilities were but a handful.2" In any event, the point was made
and an influential pressure group had its attention drawn to the issue
of the federal role in urban transportation.
A firmer coalition had also been established between the central
cities and the railroads, although many of the carriers still viewed
federal participation with suspicion. Dilworth and James Symes, Presi-
dent of the Pennsylvania Railroad, worked together in drafting legisla-
tion to be presented to Congress under he asuspices tof the AMA. Their
aim was to meet immediate needs and at the same time to evolve a
legislative program agreeable to both the AMA and the embattled com-
muter railroads. The legislation called for low-interest loans to be made
by the Department of Commerce to states, local governments and
authorities for the acquisition, maintenance and improvement of mass
transport equipment and facilities.
Although it was expected that the legislation would get a warm
reception from neither the Eisenhower Administration nor the 86th
Congress, the bill had been constructed to quell possible displeasure
from potentially hostile pressure groups with the hope that perhaps the
next Congress would be more receptive. The mistake usually made by
the railroads of trying, through legislation, to deny benefits of govern-
ment largesse to other modes was avoided; they merely requested bene-
fits for themselves."0 Moreover, the legislation's appeal was broadened
by the provision for aid to urban mass transportation in general, not to
big city commuter railroads and rapid transit in particular. Thus, it was
hoped that general support from traffic beleaguered cities throughout the
country would be forthcoming. The major error, however, was in placing
the administration of the proposed bill in the hands of the highway-
oriented Department of Commerce. As a matter of policy, the Depart-
ment was opposed to any federal involvement in local transit problems.
In February, 1960 a delegation of mayors and railroad represen-
tatives presented their case to the Secretary of Commerce, representa-
tives of the Budegt Bureau, congressional leaders and representatives
of the congressional committees that would consider the measure. The
reception was noncommittal at best. On the brighter side, however,
29. For example, the panel discussion on transport problems in large cities mod-
erated by Dilworth, despite his efforts, constantly strayed from the rail issue. See gen-
erally AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL CON-
GRESS (1959) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
30. See Altshuler, supra note 16, at 27-28.
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both Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and House Speaker Sam
Rayburn pledged their support for the proposed legislation."' Neverthe-
less, the situation continued to look bleak until Senator Harrison
Williams (D.-N.J.) came upon the scene.
If within their own ranks the city interests found a champion on the
transit issue in Mayor Dilworth, they found an equally needed champion
in the Congress in Senator Williams. Williams, as a freshman in the
Senate was seeking an issue that would aid his New Jersey con-
stituents and yet would have relatively broad national interest. He
found his opportunity in the mass transportation issue.
As a senator, Williams was in an excellent position to produce
results. The six year term of a senator permits more time to be spent
on important matters of legislation. A senator is also blessed with
greater resources for vital staff work. Since a senator's constituency is
statewide, his viewpoint is also broader. Moreover, the Senate has, in
recent years, been far more interested than the House in needed in-
novations in government and more intent that the federal government
exercise its leadership function. 2
Williams and his staff went to work to make needed changes in
the legislative proposals prepared by Dilworth and Symes. The intitial
step was to shift the bill from the hostile Department of Commerce
by promoting the legislation as a measure for urban areas. The imple-
mentation, therefore, would be under the jurisdiction of the Housing
and Home Finanace Agency, which at that time was the closest thing
to a Department of Urban Affairs. The change would also place con-
sideration of the legislation in the hands of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, of which Williams was a member. This com-
mittee was likely to be far friendlier to the legislation than the Com-
merce Committee would be. To add to the bill's palatability, the original
proposal for 500 million dollars in loan authorizations was reduced to
100 million dollars. Backed by the AMA and the commuter railroad
interests, Williams introduced his bill on March 24, 1960.""
The Senate was friendly to the legislation, and Williams' bill8 '
was passed by that body on June 27, 1960. In the House, however, the
bill never got out of committee. However, with a national election in
the near future, Democrats and others with an urban stake wished to go
31. DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 111-13.
32. Id. at 116.
33. Id. at 129-33.
34. S.3278, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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on record in support of an urban measure. Additional support, therefore,
was expected in the next session of Congress.
While the Democrats did not sweep Congress in the 1960 election,
they did manage to elect a President who was firmly convinced. of the
importance of urban issues and of the need for the federal government
to cope with the staggering problems that faced metropolitan areas.
John Kennedy was the first man to run for President with a major thrust
of his campaign aimed at the problems of urban areas. In contrast,
Richard Nixon virtually ignored the urban issue. Kennedy's election,
therefore, marked a critical turning point in the attitude of the national
government toward urban problems. When campaigning for the nom-
ination, Kennedy spoke to the 1959 American Municipal Association
Congress. In his speech he said:
Our national defense posture, our Federal budget, our schools,
highways, interest rates, race relations, reclamation, juvenile
delinquency and the steel strike will be great issues in the 1960
election. But I would like to stress perhaps the greatest issue
in a sense but the issue which is going to be talked about
probably the least based on my own experience of traveling
around the United States in the past year. I am asked what I
think on the subject of birth control for India and what we
should do in outer space, but hardly ever am I asked what we
should do about the cities of the United States. I would say
this is the greatest unspoken issue in the 1960 election and I
think therefore we should address ourselves to it.8
THE RATIONALE OF FEDERAL URBAN TRANSPORT POLICY
As the Kennedy Administration took office, the path seemed re-
latively clear for federal participation in urban mass transportation
programs. There was still, however, no major support from the general
public. Except for some highly vocal concern expressed about the loss
of commuter service immediately after the passage of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1958, there had been no substantial pressure either organized
or unorganized from any significant segment of the public. As a happier
note, however, no major opposition group outside of Congress had
formed. It might have been reasonably expected that a coalition of high-
way interests would have aroused themselves into opposition. However,
for the most part, at that time the highway interests appeared un-
worried about the programs for urban mass transportation, since the
35. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 29, at 24.
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promoters of mass transport legislation had been careful to put the bill
in terms of highways and mass transport.
The opposition which did develop against the program stemmed
from those who disfavored further federal involvement in local affairs,
regardless of the nature of the proposed legislation. The opponents of
increased federal urban action were still a strong force in Congress,
although by no means a majority. Their effectiveness lay in being able
to get others to join them as part of the political logrolling in which
Congress indulges. Therefore, since the proposed mass transit program
had no loud murmur of grassroots public support, it appeared to have
little political attraction. Even to many persons in Washington who
were not adverse to federal action, it still seemed that urban transporta-
tion was a local issue to be handled on the local level.
Washington was, however, in the process of reevaluating the
federal approach to many urban problems. Even prior to the 1960
election there had been a rising dismay over the rapidly deteriorating
urban situation in many parts of the country. It had become obvious
that urban highway policy, as carried out by the federal government in
the 1950's, was not a solution to all urban transport problems. Despite
the vital need for urban highways and the tremendous increase in
highway construction expenditures in the postwar era, the visible blight
of congestion continued to increase. As the new. more urban-oriented
administration took office, there was evidence of concern for the entire
urban situation. Transport was only one element of a broader attack
to be made on the urban problems.
Even though many federal programs had been aimed at helping
cities, federal programs had actually aided in the devitalization of the
city. For example, beyond their stated functions, the Federal Housing
Administration and Veterans' Administration loan programs were the
guardian angels of ticky-tacky suburban developments. Urban renewal
projects had displaced many poor people, while the renewal project
itself provided housing for only medium- and upper-income groups. The
highway program did not relieve congestion; indeed, in many instances
it made it worse.
THE AIMS OF FEDERAL POLICY
The objectives of federal urban transportation policy were shaped
both by the short-run needs of big cities in danger of losing vital
commuter railway and mass transit services and the long-run needs of
providing for less chaotic development in rapidly growing metropolitan
areas. While the big city mayors had looked toward the federal govern-
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ment to help preserve existing services as reasonable alternatives to the
private automobile, the policy of the federal government had been more
comprehensive. The general aim of federal policy was to treat mass
transport as an integral part of urban development.86
The federal goals were three in number: (1) to preserve and
enhance urban values; (2) to serve population at lowest cost and (3)
to help shape cities. These goals were to be accomplished in a coordinated
manner by achieving a balance between the use of private and public
vehicles. The objectives are interesting since they treated the urban
mass transportation issue in a far broader perspective than had hitherto
been the case. While the old "save the commuter trains" notion can be
seen within these three objectives, something larger and of a higher
spirit was envisioned.
Beneath the goal of preservation and enhancement of urban values
rested a realization that the central city was too often a rotting core.
There is considerable truth in the comment that the metropolitan area
could be compared with the doughnut-nothing in the middle and the
dough all around the edges. Statistics indicated that central cities were
growing financially weaker while becoming increasingly overburdened
by social problems. The city had become a place to work in and to get
away from.
As an objective, preservation of the city was not a completely
unselfish motive. Economic interests were vitally concerned with property
values. Continuing deterioration endangered the values of property
located in the central city. Various federal renewal programs, coupled
with transportation programs that would provide easier access to central
business district property, seemed, therefore, most appealing. Retail
establishments also had a vital concern since improved access to down-
36. Federal policy aims were perhaps most clearly stated by Pres. Kennedy's trans-
portation message of 1962 which read in part:
To conserve and enhance values in existing urban areas is essential. But
at least as important are steps to promote economic efficiency and livability in
areas of future development. In less than 20 years we can expect well over half
of our expanded population to be living in 40 great urban complexes. Many
smaller places will also experience phenomenal growth. The ways that people
and goods can be moved in these areas will have a major influence on their
structure, on the efficiency of their economy, and on the availability for social
and cultural opportunities they can offer their citizens. Our national welfare
therefore requires the provision of good urban transportation, with the properly
balanced use of private vehicles and modern mass transport to help shape as
well as seve urban growth.
J. F. Kennedy, THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEiM OF OUR NATION, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th
Cong. 2d Sess. 9-10 (1962) [hereinafter cited as IENNmDY].
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town shopping districts by public transportation would doubtless help
to boost sales.
The values to be preserved and enhanced in the urban areas are,
however, not merely economic values. Social interests and needs are also
to be met by the urban transportation program. If improved mass trans-
portation would help reduce congestion and make mobility easier, com-
munications between people and places could be greatly enhanced. Ease
of movement through at least partial removal of the congestion barrier
could make city life more interesting and vital.
In the shaping of cities as a goal for mass transportation policy, one
can see an attempt to regain some of the lost opportunities of the New
Deal. In the 1930's, however, failure of proper control by the federal
government had encouraged sprawling metropolitan development and
resultant fragmentation. Proper urban transportation planning, includ-
ing both highways and mass transportation, and greater emphasis on
comprehensive planning could help prevent further suburban sprawl.
There was a very obvious need for shaping, reshaping and rationalizing
development on the urban scene, and a properly geared mass transporta-
tion policy could help in such programs.
The goal of serving urban populations at the lowest cost had
significant attraction. First, it had a short-range appeal in that it pointed
to savings in highway investment. It soon became obvious that attrac-
tive and well-planned mass transportation systems could help relieve
pressure on all levels of government for increased highway expenditures.
On a long-run basis, the appeal of mass transportation was even greater.
Estimates of future urban populations were most frightening. Looking
ahead to the end of the twentieth century, even the most unsophisticated
observer could note that near exclusive dependence upon the automobile
in urban areas was unthinkable; there would simply be too many people,
too many cars and too little room.
Possibly having a far greater role in shaping urban transport policy
was an unpublicized shift in attitude on the part of the Bureau of the
Budget. The increasing power of the Budget Bureau pervaded the policy
of all federal departments and agencies. The Bureau seemed increasingly
unwilling to put all of the federal government's financial power behind
any one program in a given field. A mix of alternative programs, there-
fore, was usually sought. Much of recent federal transport policy seems
to reflect this position. In any event, as the 1960's wore on it was
increasingly clear that the policy of highway construction was no longer
to have a monopoly in the federal funds for urban transportation.
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THE HOUSING ACT OF 1961
The advent of the Kennedy Administration seemed to promise
fulfillment of the aims of Senator Williams and the central city-railroad
interests. Adding to the air of hope were two reports which had viewed
federal aid to mass transportation in a most favorable manner. James
Landis, in the so-called "Landis Report" on the federal regulatory
agencies, had recommended to President Kennedy that the federal
government guarantee loans for commuter railroads.87 The Doyle
Report, a study made for the Senate Commerce Committee, also re-
commended a program of federal aid. This latter study concerned itself
with many aspects of federal policy toward railways and had grown out
of the senatorial investigations which culminated in the passage of the
Transportation Act of 1958. The panicked reaction of the eastern com-
muter roads had caused a discussion of urban mass transportation to be
included in this report. As a means of solving the commuter problem, a
loan program administered by the ICC was suggested. 8
The Urban Mass Transportation Bill of 1961, introduced shortly
before the inauguration of President Kennedy, called for a program of
loan authorization and demonstration grants. The demonstration grant
idea was a new dimension that had been added to the legislative package
by Senator Williams and his chief legislative assistant, ArDee Ames. To
the dismay of its principal supporters, however, the reaction given the
legislation by the Administration was unreceptive. The new President
was burdened by many other problems, and transit seemed a minor issue.
The Bay of Pigs disaster had made the Administration reluctant to put
its prestige behind legislation that might not fare well in Congress.
Moreover, the President was advised by a number of his closest aides
that he should wait for a complete study of the urban mass trans-
portation situation before taking an Administration position. Transit,
apparently, was to be ignored by the White House. A strong and
most definite Administration position, the one outlined earlier, was
finally taken when urban mass transportation was given a position
of considerable importance in the President's Transportation Message
of April 5, 1962. However, in early 1961 it was clear that an urban mass
transportation act stood virtually no chance of passage by itself. Accord-
37. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 78
(1960).
38. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SPECIAL STUDY GROUP




ingly, the urban transportation program was included as a part of the
omnibus housing act of 1961." 9
There were three primary provisions in the Housing Act of 1961
concerning urban mass transportation. First, 25 million dollars was
authorized for mass transportation demonstration projects. This was to
prove the most important part of the Act. Second, the Act specified
that mass transportation planning should be included as an integral part
of comprehensive urban planning under the § 701 program of planning
grants. Finally, loans were authorized under the Act. Recognizing the
difficulty of raising funds for mass transport undertakings, the Housing
and Home Finance Agency was authorized to loan money at low rates
where repayment was reasonably certain." While a total of fifty million
dollars was authorized for the loan purpose, this portion of the Act and
subsequent loan programs included in mass transport legislation have
been little used. Nonuse was caused by local governments and agencies
which hoped eventually to receive grants that would not have to be
repaid.
Urban mass transportation provisions contained in the Housing
Act of 1961 were modest indeed, especialiy when compared to the
original aims and programs of the legislation initially supported by the
central city-railroad group. Only 42.5 million dollars was appropriated
for loans and demonstrations. Since it was largely a demonstration
program, the Act had some of the flavor of many governmental actions
which are the fruits of compromise; that is, it was a matter of "doing
something, but not too much." There is little doubt, however, that the
legislation was a victory for the mass transportation interests.
Despite the limited funds devoted to it, the program was one that
would draw attention to itself. The transit demonstrations that would
be conducted, being novel in the field of public mass transportation,
would naturally interest the mass media. There probably was no other
way a similar amount of money could have helped arouse interest in
mass transportation on a broad national scale. 4 Successful results from
39. For a highly interesting account of the fortunes of the mass transportation
program in the early days of the New Frontier, see DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 155-74.
40. Weaver, The Federal Interest in Urban Mass Transportation, 17 TRAFFIC Q. 25,
29 (1963).
41. The 1961 act alone did little to help the sagging fortunes of urban commuter
railways or mass transit systems. But the question of whether people will ride transit
if it is improved to some degree was answered in the affirmative by the act, partly as a
result of the work of Mayor Richardson Dilworth of Philadelphia at various hearings
conducted in connection with mass transportation legislation introduced before the Con-
gress. Dilworth pointed with great pride to the success of Philadelphia's Passenger
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a number of demonstration studies would be powerful ammunition in
prodding the federal government to play an even larger role in the
urban mass transportation situation.
THE HIGHWAY ACT OF 1962
The Highway Act of 1962, a first blush, may not seem a part of an
urban mass transportation program. Yet, it is a vital portion of the
overall package of legislation required for an intelligent approach to
the urban transportation problem. The aim of the legislation was to
fill a gap in planning which had existed for many years, and it had
grown out of a realization by the federal government of the enormous
impact highway construction had on cities. The Act and its planning
provision may, therefore, be viewed as an example of federal efforts,
however belated, to reexamine past programs which had inadvertently
gone astray.
The problems of noncomprehensive planning could be solved by
tying strings to federal money. Under the terms of § 9 of the 1962 Act,
approval of funds for federal aid to highway programs in urban areas
with populations of 50,000 or more could only be given upon a finding
by the Secretary of Commerce that proposed highway projects were
based on a comprehensive and continuing planning process, carried on
in cooperation with state and local levels of government. In requiring
comprehensive and continuing planning, the Act guaranteed that urban
areas would at least give consideration to transport alternatives other
than highways. As may be expected, cities were hard pressed to find
talent to do their planning within the deadline time, and the Bureau of
Public Roads was equally hard pressed to find qualified people to
evaluate the planning programs submitted by the municipalities.42
Whether high standards and truly comprehensive planning, in the short
run, will result from this legislation is questionable. However, the long-
run benefits of such a program are undeniable. The Act permits the
federal government to correct the mistakes made through misinterpre-
tation of model planning legislation passed in the late 1920's."8
Service Improvement Corp. and its city-sponsored experiments. Philadelphia's experi-
ence showed that patrons could indeed be wooed back to mass transportation.
42. The author is acquainted with a graduate city-planner who was unable to find
a good job in his profession just before the Highway Act of 1962 was enacted. Shortly
thereafter he had a half dozen excellent offers, including one from the Bureau of Public
Roads.
43. At the direction of Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, a nine-man
committee prepared the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928. The aim of this
action was to insure more orderly urban development, and the 1928 act became the
model adopted by most municipalities throughout the United States. "The 1928 Act
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There were many weaknesses in the model legislation. The most
glaring problem was that planning commissions, as the legislation was
interpreted, might adopt the urban general plan either as a whole or in
separate parts. As a result, plans were frequently developed in a non-
comprehensive and piecemeal fashion; this obstructed the planning pro-
cess more than it aided it. Eventually, planners began to quibble over
zoning and other microaspects of city planning rather than devoting
time and talent to overall comprehensive planning. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that there was a general failure to understand how highways
could carve up a city, the proper role for urban mass transportation
or how urban sprawl and suburban blight could be prevented.4
URBAN MASS TRANiSPORTATION ACT OF 1964
A followup measure was needed to complement the legislation
already enacted. Specifically, capital funds were needed to provide the
necessary financial transfusion for urban mass transportation. Such funds
were available through the loan provisions of the 1961 Act, but this
approach was open only in the neediest cases.45 Any sanguine hopes that
new legislation would soon be enacted to provide capital funds were
soon dispelled. The congressional hurdle was located in the House of
Representatives. With its strong rural and conservative predilections,
the House was the main force which caused the urban mass transporta-
tion program to falter in the three years after 1961. Even though
growing support was discernible from the smaller cities and suburban
Standard specifies as the principal duty of the City Planning Commission the preparation,
adoption, and maintenance of a long-range comprehensive, general plan for the physical
development of a city." T. KENT, TnE URBAN GENERAL PLAN 33 (1964).
44. Id. at 40-43. The Highway Act of 1962 belatedly put some muscle behind fed-
eral pressures for intelligent planning that could have occurred as a result of New Deal
programs almost thirty years earlier. Had such action been taken in the middle '30's,
perhaps some of the regional sprawl and fragmentized local government might have
been prevented.
45. Moreover, the Housing Act of 1961 was most specific in providing that the
money not be used for capital projects. This point was noted by the HHFA Assistant
Administrator in charge of the Office of Transportation:
[T]he prohibition of the use of demonstration grants for "major long-term
capital improvement" has been conscientiously applied because the principal and
sometimes, sole objective of some proposals was the construction of a perma-
nent transit facility for which regular financing had proved impossible. Rentals
and other recognized charges for the use of capital equipment or facilities during
the term of a demonstration was, however, recognized as a proper use of funds
insofar as the particular items could be shown to be essential to the attainment
of project objectives. Provision for crediting the project with any remaining
capital value at its conclusion has been a mandatory requirement in these cases.
Kohl, The Federal Urban Transportation Demonstration Program, 18 TRAFFIC Q. 303
(1964).
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areas,4" House opposition, along with the lack of either strong grass-
roots support or a well-organized group, enabled opponents of the
program to stall it.
Nevertheless, in the early months of 1962 it looked as if new and
far more comprehensive mass transportation legislation would soon be
forthcoming. In his transportation message, President Kennedy re-
commended:
that the Congress authorize the first installment of a long-range
program of Federal aid to our urban regions for the revitaliza-
tion and needed expansion of public mass transportation
. . .[through] a capital grant authorization of $500 million
to be made available over a 3-year period with $100 million
to be made available in fiscal 1963. ... .47
Continuation of the demonstration and loan provisions of the Act of
1961 was also recommended. The President's message focused con-
siderable attention on the need for comprehensive planning, calling for
the provision in highway legislation that was soon to be a critical part
of the Highway Act of 1962. Thus, in one message, the President had
given a tremendous boost to the profession of land-use planning, and
recommended a far stronger and larger capital grant program than
supporters of mass transportation had hoped.4 8 The prospects seemed
good for quick passage of a mass transport bill.
Immediately following the President's message, Senator Williams
introduced legislation containing a capital grant program. Subsequent
congressional hearings were generally successful in demonstration the
need for federal aid and gave evidence of strong support for the measure
from various urban interest groups.4" Both the House and Senate banking
committees reported the legislation favorably. Senator Frank Lausche
(D.-Ohio), a major foe of the mass transportation program, insisted
that since some commuters cross state lines, the Senate Commerce
Committee should also hold a hearing. In September, the Senator held
a one-day hearing and the Commerce Committee reported the bill with-
out recommendation."0 Regardless of the expected favorable Senate
46. DANIELSON, supra note 9 at 175-79.
47. KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 10. The President's recommendations were based
on a program of action advocated by Secretary of Commerce Hodges and HHFA Ad-
ministrator Weaver as a result of a study prepared for them by the Institute of Public
Administration. See FITCH, su~pra note 6, chs. 6-7; DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 174-75.
48. See Altshuler, supra note 16, at 38-39.
49. See Altshuler, supra note 16, at 39-40; DANIELSON, supra note 9, at 177.
50. See Hearings on S.3615 Before the Senate Coinin. on Commerce, 87th Cong. 2d
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action, it soon became clear that the House Rules Committee was not
going to allow the bill to reach the floor. Trapped in the Rules Committee,
the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962 died as the 87th Congress
adjourned. Despite this setback, Congress did pass a bill extending the
1961 Act for six months beyond its scheduled expiration date.5
The defeat of the 1962 Urban Mass Transportation Bill in the
supposedly liberalized House Rules Committee came as a suprise, par-
ticularly after President Kennedy's strong public support for a program
of greater aid to urban transit. Undaunted, Senator Williams submitted
a 1963 Urban Mass Transportation Bill early in the first session of the
88th Congress. Opposition developed from Senator Lausche and others
on the Surface Transportation Subcommittee. In spite of this, Williams'
bill, largely intact, passed the Senate by a 52-41 vote on.April 4.52
Even with passage of the Senate bill, it appeared that an enlarged
federal mass transport program would never succeed in the House. It
was expected that the legislation would die in committee as a casualty
of the "anti-urban revolt" of Southern Democrats in retaliation for the
Administration's civil rights program." The House version of the bill
did remain in committee for more than a year, but the House Rules
Committee was not mainly responsible for the delay. The bill was held in
the Rules Committee at the behest of House Speaker John McCormack,
who realized that if the bill was reported out for a vote it stood a good
chance of being defeated.5
Sess. (1962). The Senator seemed particularly intrigued by the testimony of Dr. Leon
Moses of Northwestern University; id. at 37-51. See also Altshuler, supra note 16, at 41.
51. Altshuler, supra note 16, at 41.
52. Id. at 43-51.
53. Needed: A Prompt End to the Old Luxury of Limited Thinking, 1963 ARCHI-
TECTURAL F. 94 (1963).
54. There was considerable political wisdom in the Speaker's action. While Pres.
Johnson had supported the programs of his predecessor, civil rights was of first im-
portance on the list of priority legislation. McCormack did not wish to jeopardize the
Administration's reputation for legislative success at that point by bringing the Urban
Transportation Bill to the floor of the House only to have it defeated.
In April, 1964, the Mass Transportation Bill was not on the White House list of
"must" legislation. To get desired action, particularly in the House of Representatives,
a strong, coordinated lobbying approach was necessary. This was the lesson learned
from the defeat of a proposal for construction of a rapid transit system in the District
of Columbia in 1963. Labor lobbyists in Washington were persuaded to bring pressure
against Congress to defeat the 1963 bill as an anti-labor measure. There was some
worry about the loss of bargaining rights and also concern that the proposed subway
system would put bus drivers out of work. Labor leaders finally realized that defeat of
the bill would actually cut down job opportunities. Unfortunately, it was too late to
make the change of heart known to Congress, and the bill was defeated in the House.
Out of this, however, supporters of metropolitan mass transportation realized the neces-
sity of lobbying.
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A pressure group was formed to push the bill. Called the Urban
Passenger Transportation Association (UPTA), it represented the
central city interests, organized labor (now firmly in the camp of
tansit), the transit industry and the railroads. Labor's active interest
and membership in this grou p was made known to President Johnson,
and by May, 1964 the mass transportation bill had found its way onto
the "must" list of legislation.
The problem then became one of convincing the Speaker to bring
the matter to the floor and of convincing enough representatives to vote
for it. The Speaker had to be shown that there were sufficient Republican
votes from northern urban centers to offset the predicted loss of Southern
Democrats. The UPTA reported that 35 to forty Republicans would
vote for the bill. McCormack finally moved the bill out of committee, but
he was still understandably reluctant to schedule it for vote. Late in May
the House Republican Policy Committee had taken a firm party stand
of direct, unalterable opposition to the mass transit bill. It is a well-
known fact that the Policy Committee rarely takes a stand when it
fears defections from its ranks. Nevertheless, the UPTA felt it had
enough support for passage and sought to convince McCormack of this.
Representative William Widnall (R.-N.J.), a most effective sup-
porter of mass transit legislation, threatened to embarrass both Speaker
McCormack and the White House. Widnall promised that he would
call a press conference to indicate Republican support sufficient to pass
the bill and at the same time denounce the Speaker and the White House
for obstruction of the legislative procedures. To avoid any embarrassment,
McCormack set the vote for June 25. The House passed the bill 212 -
189. The Senate accepted the House changes, and President Johnson
signed into law the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964."
The aim of the 1964 Act, which is the cornerstone of the present
federal transit program, is not only to provide aid for the improvement
and development of mass transportation systems but also to encourage
the planning and establishment of areawide coordinated transport. In
conjunction with the planning provisions of the Highway Act of
1962, incentive is given to the planning and development of a rational
55. 49 U.S.C. § 1601-12 (1970). Brdlik, A Legislative Miracle, 60 MErROPOLITAN
MANAGEMENT, TRANS. & PLANNING, 26, 50 (1964), Burke, The Tangled Path of a Tran-
sit Bill, THE REPORTER, July 16, 1964.
Senator Mansfield called the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 a legislative
miracle because never in his memory had so many Republicans deserted the party line
set by the Republican Policy Committee. Miracle or not, the Act of 1964 was a decided
step forward in the overall federal program of mass transportation encouragement and
support.
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and integrated urban transport system combining both the private auto-
mobile and mass transportation.
There were three major portions of the 1964 Act. One portion
continued the program of demonstrations originated under the Housing
Act of 1961. Under the 1964 legislation, however, it became possible to
initiate demonstrations on an independent basis, as well as by contract
with sponsors on the local level. Furthermore, matching funds from the
local area are not mandatory, although it was assumed that the two-
thirds federal, one-third local contributions scheme followed under the
1961 Act would be continued. The program of low-interest loans begun
under the 1961 Act was also continued under the 1964 legislation.
The most interesting segment of the Act was that involving grants
of capital. Under the terms of the Act, there was both a long-run program
of aid and a short-run, or emergency, program. Under the long-run
program a city must satisfy the HHFA Administrator that:
the facilities and equipment for which the assistance is
sought are needed for carrying out a program . . . for a unified
or officially coordinated urban transportation system as a part
of a comprehensive and continuing program of planned
development. 6
The funds might be used for almost any capital project except the
construction of public highways.5 7
There were other important provisions. Persons displaced by capital
improvement projects receiving grants from the federal government
were able to receive payments of up to 200 dollars for purposes of reloca-
tion. Displaced business firms could receive displacement aid up to
3,000 dollars. Job protection was also provided for labor, including
continuation of the rights of collective bargaining, wage security and
retraining. While all grants or loans were to be made to public bodies,
56. The Secretary, on the basis of engineering studies, studies of economic
feasibility, and data showing the nature and extent of expected utilization of the
facilities and equipment, shall estimate what portion of the cost of a project to
be assisted under section 1602 of this title cannot be reasonably financed from
revenues-which portion shall hereinafter be called "net project cost."
49 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1970).
57. The short-run program is predicated on the need to keep a jeopardized transport
operation running under emergency conditions. Where the planning for the develop-
ment of a unified or coordinated transport system was under way, but not yet completed,
a federal grant of up to fifty per cent of the net project cost may be made. If -the
planning is completed within three years of the execution of the grant agreement, an
additional sum is granted to bring the federal contribution up to the full two-thirds of
the net project cost. Thus, planning is encouraged but not at the cost of permitting a
transport system to cease operations.
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private enterprise was given encouragement to participate in conjunction
with public agencies. No state could receive more than 122 per cent
of the total funds disbursed. The Act also authorized the expenditure of
75 million dollars for fiscal year 1965 and 150 million dollars each year
for fiscal years 1966 and 1967. Up to ten million dollars of this sum
was to be available for demonstration grants the first year of the Act,
and this sum was to be increased to twenty million dollars in 1965 and
thirty million dolars in 1966.8
THE AMENDMENTS OF 1966
Federal programs, particularly those in embroyonic stages, are
rarely left in their orignal state. Urban mass transportation legislation
was no exception. With the addition of the capital grant program and
the planning requirements of the 1964 Act, federal programs of aid and
encouragement to mass transport had moved well beyond the Act of
1961. Much remained to be done, however, for if the mass transport
program was out of its infancy, it still had to experience the awkwardness
of adolescence.
One of the most conspicuous gaps in the program was that of fund-
ing. Despite its importance as a legislative milestone, the 1964 Act was
a small program in comparison to other federal expenditures in the field
of transportation. Between the passage of the Housing Act of 1961 and
the last quarter of 1966, approximately 375 million dollars was spent for
programs under the 1961 and 1964 Acts. During the same period,
however, about 24 billion dollars was spent by the federal government
on highways, airways and waterways. "
In many cities, capital expenditures alone would not be enough.
Operating deficits plagued the often meager financial resources of many
municipalities. Even federal aid under the 1964 Act could not guarantee
58. 49 U.S.C. § 1603(c) & 1605(c) (1970). See also At last: Congress Approves
Tranzsit Aid, RAILWAY AGE, July 6, 1964, at 28-29; Smerk, The Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Act of r964: New Hope for American Cities, 5 TRANSPORTATION J. 37-38 No. 2
(1965).
59. Ass'w OF AMER IcAN RAILROADS, BuREAu 9F RAILWAY EcoNoMIcs, GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES FOR CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF TRANSPORT FA-
CILITIES By AIR, HIGHWAY, AND WATERWAY AND PRIVATF EXPENDITURES FOR CONSTRUC-
TION, MAINTENANCE OF WAY, AND TAXES OF RAILROAD FACILITIES 4 (1965). The Insti-
tute for Public Administration has estimated that about ten billion dollars will be re-
quired for mass transport investment by 1975. The prediction is probably well on the
modest side; New York City alone could utilize two billion dollars for new construction
and improvement of existing facilities in the next ten years. About thirty billion dollars
should be spent on urban mass transportation in the 1970's to bring transit operations all
over the nation up to a reasonable level of quality. See FITCH, supra note 6, at 55-57;
Mass Transport: A $zO Billion Market, RAILWAY AGE, Feb. 18, 1963, at 25.
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any solution to that problem. Indeed, some cities were so poor that they
could not match federal grants for demonstration or capital purposes,
even after the grants were approved by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD)."
Another financial problem that grew out of the 1964 Act was the
need to provide the sort of plans and cost estimates necessary to qualify
for a grant of capital. A city seeking funds to buy new buses might not
run into much difficulty with engineering expense. However, for a large
scale project, expecially one concerning rapid transit or a commuter
railway, many thousands of dollars are required to perform the engineer-
ing and planning studies needed to qualify for a grant. No federal aid
was available for such purposes. Furthermore, there was a need for more
research. Although the demonstration program had provided a valuable
tool for increasing knowledge about mass transport, the program could
hardly be considered a systematic research program. Nothing approach-
ing the development of a complete "package" of high-caliber mass trans-
port equipment, practices or systems had been developed.
Another appalling gap in the American transport system had
become painfully clear at approximately the same time the urban trans-
portation crisis came to a head. As intercity travel rapidly expanded in
the post-World War II period, the "American transportation system"
was found to be no system at all, but rather a mixture of competing and
uncoordinated private and public carriers.1
Still another shortcoming was in the caliber of management of mass
transport systems. One of the major mass transportation problems was
the need to sell mass transport service to the public. If mass transit
was to play a larger role in urban areas, the service offered would have
to be marketed effectively. The many years of decline in the industry
had made it attractive neither to talented and experienced business
managers nor to bright, young, college-trained men. Professional man-
agement, with the broad base of business skills needed to operate
successfully in the mid-twentieth century, was sorely lacking in the
transit industry.
The year for meeting these problems was 1966. During that year
the authorization of funds under the Act of 1964 became depleted.
Interest in urban transportation, however, had been stirred on several
60. On June 30, 1964, 185,353 dollars was approved for use by Syracuse, New York,
provided a matching sum of 92,647 dollars was forthcoming. Syracuse could not find
the money, and the demonstration was cancelled in January, 1965.
61. See Herbert, Transporting People, INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY,
Oct. 1965, at 30-42.
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issues early in the second session of the 89th Congress. For example,
on January 20, Senator Williams introduced a bil 2 to authorize certain
grants to assure adequate commuter service in urban areas. It was aimed
at providing federal funds to defray half the cost of deficit operations.
At the same time, he also introduced a bill" relating to the discon-
tinuation or change in certain services performed by railroads, in order
to require the ICC to give full consideration to all financial assistance
available before permitting any such discontinuation or change. Somewhat
earlier, another bill had been introduced by Senator Joseph Tydings
(D.-Md.) that concentrated on the need for more research and develop-
ment. The basis of this proposed legislation was that ten million dollars
be made available annually from the federal government to develop
new urban transport technology.64
The heart of the changes finally adopted in 1966 was to be found
in legislation introduced by Senator Williams.6" As reported, this bill
called for an increase in the amount of money made available each year
from 150 million dollars to 225 million dollars. It also granted aid for
the planning, engineering and designing of urban mass transport systems,
training programs to help upgrade transport management and grants
to college and other nonprofit institutions for research purposes. In
addition, the legislation directed HUD to research new transport systems.
The measure introduced by Senator Williams to allow the federal govern-
ment to cover up to fifty per cent of the operating deficits of transport
agencies was killed in committee.6
In the House, the Committee on Banking and Currency reported
favorably on H.R. 14810. This bill was similar in content to the legisla-
tion in the Senate except that it had no provisions for management
training programs and called for expenditure of only 175 million
dollars annually for mass transportation purposes.67 However, the re-
commended House bill went far beyond the Senate version in one import-
ant financial matter. It provided that beginning in fiscal year 1968, 175
million dollars would be authorized "for each fiscal year thereafter," thus
making the federal mass transportation activity a permanently funded
program. 8 The certainty that the federal mass transport assistance
programs would continue gave stability to the efforts of HUD. This
62. S.2804, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
63. S.2805, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
64. S.2599, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
65. S.3700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
66. S. REP. No. 1436, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
68. Id. at 10.
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certainty would also relieve HUD of the need to return periodically to
Congress in order to justify the continuance of the program. It would
also "give assurance that a locality starting on . . . expensive, long-
term commitments for new or improved transit systems can count on
continuing Federal assistance." 9
The debate that took place in both bodies of Congress was fairly
extensive, but the major items for discussion centered around the amount
of money to be spent rather than the issue of whether or not there was
a federal role to be played in the field of urban transportation. This
change in attitude was to have important implications in the years
following 1966.
In the Senate, Senator John Tower (R.-Tex.) pushed for economy
and introduced an amendment to cut spending from the 225 million
dollars recommended by the Committee on Banking and Currency to
150 million dollars a year. The cost of the war in Vietnam and the
urging of President Johnson that government keep its spending down
were the reasons most often invoked.7' The Senate voted in favor of the
bill 47 - 34. Senator Tower won the day, however, and authorization
for expenditures was reduced to 150 million dollars a year for the next
two fiscal years, thus continuing the practice of low budgets for mass
transportation.
There was remarkably little general opposition to the bill that was
debated in the House. Many rose to support the legislation, although
Representative Paul Fino (R.-N.Y.) was unsuccessful in getting either
federal funds to pay interest on bonds or relaxation of the 122 per cent
limit on funds to any given state. The big defeat came in authorizing
funds for the program. Far from providing 175 million dollars annually,
the bill was amended to provide 175 million dollars for one year only.
The amended bill, however, passed the House by 235 - 127, and was
sent on to a joint Senate-House conference committee to iron out the
differences. 71 President Johnson signed the resulting measure into law on
September 8, 1966.
The legislation as finally enacted provided for 150 million dollars
for each of the fiscal years 1967-1969. The new law provided for in-
creased sums to be devoted to the demonstration grant program-forty
million dollars for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1967 and fifty
million dollars for the next fiscal year. In addition, funds were made
available for the planning, engineering and designing of urban mass
69. Id. at 5.
70. 112 CONG. REc. 18576-77 (1966).
71. See 112 CONG. REC. 19560-91 (1966).
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transportation projects. Section 9 of the amended Urban Mass Trans-
portation Act reads, in part:
Activities assisted under this section may include (1) studies
related to management, operations, capital requirements, and
economic feasibility; (2) preparation of engineering and archi-
tectural surveys, plans, and specifications; and (3) other
similar or related activities preliminary and in preparation for
the construction, acquisition, or improved operation of mass
transportation systems, facilities, and equipment. 2
In addition to the engineering money made available, funds were
also provided for management training programs. Under the amend-
ment to § 10, federal money up to 1 2 million dollars a year was made
available for management training purposes. This was to be awarded in
a maximum of 100 fellowships annually, not exceeding 12,000 dollars
each. Like so many mass transport programs, the management training
program was a much needed undertaking, but the sum made available
was not commensurate with the need.
In a new program under § 11, three million dollars a year was made
available in grants to public and private nonprofit institutions of higher
learning to conduct comprehensive research in the problems of urban
transportation. Not only was research to be carried out, but persons
could also be trained to research or carry on managerial activities with
operating companies. A final provision of the 1966 amendments directed
the Secretary of HUD, the agency administering the urban mass trans-
portation program, to consult with the Secretary of Commerce and
thereafter to undertake a project to study and prepare, develop and
demonstrate new systems of urban transportation. Encouragement was
given in this section to the investigation of more exotic forms of trans-
portation. The New System research program was the device through
which this was to be done.
The New Systems program was fostered by Representative Henry
Reuss (D.-Wis.) who felt that the demonstration grants provided for in
the 1964 Act did not meet the needs of the urban transportation problem.
While he felt that the demonstrations had been useful, he did not think
they had fully exhausted the broad range of technical solutions to urban
transit problems.7 The Johnson Administration was indifferent to such
a program of research, and the representatives of urban transportation
72. 49 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1970).
73. D. LAWRENCE, THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION IN URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
POLICYMAKING: THE NEw SYSTEms EXAMPLE 3-4 (1970).
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interest groups failed initially to see any need for federal leadership in
encouraging research of a more sophisticated nature.'4 Reuss introduced
the New Systems idea as an amendment to the Administration's trans-
portation bill while the bill was under consideration in an executive session
of the House Banking and Currency Committee. The Reuss amendment
gained support and was included in the final version of the bill as it
was released from committee. In the Senate, Senator Tydings and nine
others introduced similar legislation."5
HUD was not prepared to deal with the New Systems research
program. It had almost no staff to devote to the activity and, since HIUD
officials became aware of the program only three months before the bill
passed, they had made no procedural plans to conduct such a study. The
task, therefore, fell to the Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Develop-
ment, Charles Haar, to devise a way to conduct the study.
Haar's philosophy on how to affect innovation was to acquire
a good number of bright people, give each of them a problem
to solve, keep them isolated from each other, and then evaluate
the many forthcoming solutions."
Haar felt that aerospace, engineering and consulting firms had the proper
expertise to conduct the work. Requests for proposals were sent to inter-
ested industrial firms, universities, research institutes and other potential
sources. Seventeen contractors were finally selected early in 1967."
Because of Haar's personal bias, most of the firms chosen had a definite
hardware orientation. Nevertheless, many of the contractors, in their
final reports, recognized the institutional problems involved."
Events in mass transport programs were plentiful in 1967. Basically
this was due to the New Systems program. For the first time the Urban
Transprotation Administration undertook research projects of a future-
oriented nature for the purpose of determining the type of transportation
systems that were either possible or needed. The research focused on
three periods: the immediate future (up to three years), fifteen to
twenty years in the future and up to the turn of the century." While
the caliber of research work was high in some cases and imagina-
74. Id. at 7-8, 10-11.
75. Id. at 12, 14-16.
76. Id. at 21.
77. Id. at 22-25.
78. Id. at 25-34.
79. The findings from the studies were summarized in DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEVELOPIENT, TomoRRow's TRANSPORTATION: NEw SYSTEMS FOR THE URBAN FUTURE
(1968).
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tive in others, the projects carried out had little value for cities currently
faced with mobility problems. The immediate problem of the hard-
pressed cities was money, and the anemic state of the budget for mass
transit provided little encouragement. To many observers, however, it
seemed foolish to study future systems when there were insufficient
funds to provide aid for existing systems.8"
Another event in 1967 had portent for the future of mass transpor-
tation programs. On April 1 the new Department of Transportation
(DOT) became a Cabinet-level agency of the federal government. In
passing the Act establishing DOT"' Congress ordered the secretaries of
HUD and DOT to study the question of whether the mass transporta-
tion program should be moved to DOT. Organizing the new depart-
ment took time, but by early 1968 it was clear that DOT was highly
interested in taking over the mass transportation programs.
Within the federal establishment, it was clear that there was some
disillusionment with the handling of the mass transportation programs
within HUD. The Bureau of the Budget was apparently disappointed at
the relatively slow progress that was being made, not only in carrying
out substantial improvements in mass transportation, but also in working
efficiently and diplomatically with Congress to secure more funds for
the programs.8 2 Organizationally, the great difficulty with HUD was
that the mass transit program was buried within the structure of that
department, coming under the Office of Metropiltan Development. High
level administrators in HUD appeared far more concerned with the
larger problems of that particular section of the agency. It was felt by
many with an interest in mass transportation that relatively short shrift
was being given the transit programs. Unfortunately, Assistant Secretary
Haar, who headed the Office, had difficulties in building and maintaining
a strong relationship with Congress, a relationship that was critical in
getting the necessary funding for any of the programs. The sad fact
80. A sample of the adverse criticism may be found in the paper by Sen. Gordon
Allott, Urban Transit: Paper or Progress, delivered at the Third International Confer-
ence on Urban Transportation, Pittsburgh, Pa., in 1968 (reprinted by the WABCO
Mass Transit Center, Westinghouse Air Brake Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 1651 et. seq. (1970).
82. Among mass transportation advocates, particularly the big city interests, un-
happiness and concern arose over the fact that no major advance had been made in the
funding for capital programs. Part of the problem was undoubtedly that HUD was
very closely identified with the Great Society programs of the Johnson administration,
and these programs had fallen on hard times. The mass transit programs could hardly
avoid being tarred with the same brush as the rest of HUD.
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was that the Urban Transportation Administration was poorly funded
as well as dreadfully understaffed.83
On the other hand, DOT was not in trouble insofar as the Great
Society programs or the general debacle of the latter part of the
Johnson Administration was concerned. Indeed, for the first year or so,
it is fair to say that DOT was in the honeymoon period where experi-
mentation and flexibility were still possible. This was not true with
HUD, which had inherited many long standing agencies which had
lost much glamour in the eyes of a Congress increasingly cynical about
the effectiveness of HUD's activities.
Alan Boyd, the first Secretary of DOT, indicated to a House
committee that if a shift of the transit programs to DOT was carried
out, the urban transportation agency would be placed on a high level
within the DOT organization. Indeed, it would be on an equal footing
with the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Railway
Administration and would, thus, move up a number of steps in the pecking
order for both the ear and the influence of the Secretary.
President Johnson announced in early 1968 that the Urban Trans-
portation Administration would be switched from HUD to DOT.84
Shortly thereafter, the report of the study conducted by the secretaries
of HUD and DOT practically decided the matter, stating:
We therefore commend that there be transferred to the
Secretary of Transportation such functions and authorities as
he may need to provide effective leadership in urban transporta-
tion matters. We also recommend that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development intensify its efforts in
promoting comprehensive planning, including comprehensive
transportation planning, and that the two Departments work
closely together in developing the standards, criteria, rules,
regulations, or procedures that are needed to assure that trans-
portation will be fully related to urban development goals.85
The Senate did not hold hearings on the question. In the House hearings
83. As an example, the Urban Transportation Administration had run out of travel
money in January, 1968, six months before the new fiscal year would bring in more
administrative funds. The two-man staff could carry out surveillance of programs and
projects only by letter or telephone.
84. REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 2, 1968, FOR TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 262,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
85. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATION BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 281, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
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there was much assurance given by Boyd and HUD offcials that the two
departments would work very closely together.8 6
It was clear that interested and influential members of Congress
had sincere intentions that the mass transportation program was not
to become overwhelmed by highway backers in DOT. According to
the agreement between the HUD and DOT secretaries, HUD was to
continue to be involved in parts of some programs, particularly the
research and demonstration programs. The capital grant program was
to move to DOT; however, .the approval of the required comprehensive
planning remained in the hands of IUD.87 The final result was that
HUD went quietly out of the transit business. For a time it retained
oversight of a few projects which had been started under its jurisdiction.
Hoever, for practical purposes, after 1968 HUD had relatively little
to do with mass transportation.
In the meantime, however, the mass transportation programs had
bogged down because of the uncertainty created by the agency change-
over. Administrators were reluctant to make important decisions on
most matters because of the proposed transfer of departments. Even
after it was assured that the switchover would take place, there was
still delay until the move was accomplished. The announcement by
President Johnson that he would not run in 1968 also raised the specter
of a possible change in administration. Adding to the slowdown was a
physical move into the new DOT building which was finally ready for
occupancy in September, 1968. Finally, the election of Richard Nixon
made lame ducks of Johnson Administration officials. It is fair to say
that insofar as real progress in mass transporation programs was con-
cerned, 1968 was a period of slowdown.
THE ACT OF 1970
Within a few months of taking office, the Nixon Administration
86. Hearing Before a Subcoinin. of the House Comm. on Government Operations;
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1968 (Urban Mass Transportation), 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 14-17 (1968). The major question before the House committee was whether DOT
would fully realize the role that transportation plays in urban development. In all
honesty, because of its over-all mandate, HUD would be expected to be far more sensitive
to the issues of urban development but in the final analysis, brilliant lobbying convinced
key senators and congressmen that DOT was a better place for the mass transportation
programs than HUD.
87. Agreenent between the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopinent and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. (This is a mimeo-
graphed document signed by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Robert
Weaver, on September 9, 1968, and by Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd on Septem-
ber 10, 1968.) For commentary on the agreement, see On the Washington Sceie, METRo-
PoLiTAN Nov./Dec. 1968, at 28, 30.
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had a chance to evaluate what it had inherited. Looking at the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration, as the agency was named after
it had been transferred from HUD, it was apparent that UMTA was
undermanned. For example, although it was placed on the same or-
ganizational level in DOT as the Federal Highway Administration, which
had 40,000 employees, UMTA had a total of only 58 staff people. There
was no question that most of the staff was highly dedicated; however,
there were not enough people even to administer the programs and
projects UMTA had in hand. Even though the level of expenditures by
UMTA was not high in comparison to other federal agencies, on a per
man basis it averaged one of the highest ratios of money to manpower
in the federal government. The ordinary routine of overseeing projects
already begun made it difficult to evaluate the new proposals which came
in.
In early 1969 there seemed to be no strong lobbying voice for the
mass transportation program. The main constituency of the UMTA
programs, the urban transportation industry, was relatively ineffective
as a lobbying group with Congress. Part of the problem was a dichotomy
within the industry. Those interested in rail commuter and rapid transit
operation had relatively little to do with the American Transit Associa-
tion, which largely represented the bus interests. Indeed, there had been
some concern earlier that the latter organization's policy did not fully
reflect the needs of the major cities which contained rail mass trans-
portation.
Within the Institute for Rapid Transit, a number of the railroads
with commuter operations seemed to feel little common interest with
rapid transit operators, preferring to work through the Association of
American Railroads. All groups attempted to carry out lobbying acti-
vities, but they were relatively ineffective separately. Adding to the
problem, city officials had become used to working with HUD and its
predecessor agencies over the years on a variety of urban problems; they
now had to become accustomed to working with a new department.
Even though the situation appeared unsettled during and immediate-
ly after the changeover in administrations, a most encouraging position
was taken by President Nixon on the mass transportation issue. Both
the President and his Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, took a
strong stand on giving priority treatment to urban mass transportation
problems in the first session of Congress under the new Administration.
What made such a position encouraging was the fact that the mass
transportation program was often viewed as a child of the Democratic
Party.
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In making mass transportation into an issue which could garner
substantial congressional support, there were a number of inherent
difficulties. In the minds of many legislators the mass transportation
activities of the federal government were still tarnished by the Great
Society debacle. Federal mass transportation programs had never been
wildly popular in Congress. The programs appeared to lack glamour
and had not provided the sort of image that would allow legislators
to support them without suffering within their constituencies. An
observer in early 1969 would be accurate in stating that mass transit
was a "safe" issue only for a senator from a state with one or more
major urban centers or to a representative from a congressional district
in a large urban area.
Counteracting the image of mass transit as primarily a big city
affair was the steady failure of private mass transit firms. The growing
inflation of the late 1960's was a severe blow to an industry that was
relatively labor intensive. Labor costs rose sharply as new contracts
with the various unions were made. The cost of equipment and supplies
also rose sharply. Marginal private operators all over the nation began
to fail. An increasing number of cities found that they would have to
take over their transit systems if service was to continue. Pressure began
to mount on congressmen to augment the mass transit programs.
The most serious problem, as far as cities were concerned, was that
future funding of the mass transportation program was uncertain. This
made capital projects particularly unpopular at the local level. By 1969
a number of urban areas that had received technical studies grants were
ready to give serious consideration to the construction or extension of
rapid transit systems. Without the certainty of capital grants in the
future, it was impossible to move ahead.
A means of remedying the problems of long-range financing was
contained in bills introduced into Congress in early 1969. The bill in the
Senate was introduced by Senator Williams and bills in the House were
introduced by Representatives Wright Patman (D.-Tex.), William
Barrett (D.-Pa.), Edward Koch (D.-N.Y.) and William Moorhead
(D.-Pa.). All of these bills called for the use of trust fund financing,
similar to the highway trust fund, in order to provide sustained support
for transit programs. The strength of the trust fund approach is that
the money is provided regularly, thereby negating the need for Congress
to use the general fund for appropriations. A possible source of trust
fund money was the excise tax on new automobiles. This money did not
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go into the highway trust fund, and utilizing it did not seem likely to
anger the highway interests.8"
Through much of his commentary on mass transportation in the
Spring and early Summer of 1969, it became clear that Secretary
Volpe, who apparently felt he was voicing the thoughts of the Admin-
istration, supported the use of a trust fund to help finance the federal
transit system. Although highway interests greeted this with dismay at
first, the possibility of using the excise tax on automobiles, rather than
the money of the highway trust fund, allayed their anxiety. At this point
things began to look better for a greatly expanded mass transportation
program. A setback came, however, in August, 1969 when President
Nixon proposed a ten billion dollar program in mass transportation
over a twelve-year period, but at the same time made it perfectly clear
that he had no intention of having the transit programs funded through
a trust fund, at least in the near future. Since the Bureau of the Budget
had taken a dim view of the transit trust fund approach, the idea was
dead. 9
At about this time, a coalition of interest groups began to form.
The catalytic force was a combination of the Conference of Mayors and
the National League of Cities. The coalition initially was composed of
the Mayors' Conference, the League, the Institute for Rapid Transit, the
American Transit Association and the railroads.
In the Fall of 1969, the urban transportation interest group made
it clear to the highway lobby that they too had an important stake in
supporting a well-financed transit program. The criticial point to the
highway interests was the fact that the highway trust fund was soon
to be revalued by Congress. Big city mayors let it be known through
the coalition that they would take a highly critical view of continuation
of the highway trust fund and the steady flow of money to the highway
program if the highway interests did not back the mass transportation
program. Assured that the highway trust fund would not be tampered
with for transit purposes, the highway interests joined the transit
bandwagon. °
88. Sen. Williams' bill was S. 1032, which in an amended version eventually became
the Mass Transportation Act of 1970. See PASSENGER TRANSPORT, Feb. 21, 1969; PAS-
SENGER TRANSPORT, Mar. 21, 1969, for comment on the introduction of the legislation.
89. See PASSENGER TRANSPORT, Aug. 15, 1969, at 1; METROPOLITAN, Sept./Oct.,
1969, at 36-38.
90. The highwaymen were wise to sacrifice at the time in return for support in the
future. Many mayors and public officials had become disillusioned with the highway
program, and citizens were voicing displeasure with the practice of ramming highways
through residential areas or places of historic interest. The Bureau of the Budget felt
that the Highway Trust Fund should be abolished, or at least altered to allow the funds
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The problem of guaranteed funding remained, even though general
support for mass transit was building. The Nixon program called for
authorization of 3.1 billion dollars to begin with, but this did not
mean a binding obligation. Congress still would need to make annual
appropriations, and the long-range projects would still suffer from
uncertainty.9 The breakthrough came when Senator Williams intro-
duced an amendment to overcome the objections to the short-term
nature of the annual appropriations process and yet not depart from the
Administration's program."
Williams' amendment provided, in part:
To finance the programs and activities, including admin-
istrative costs, under this act, the Secretary is authorized to
incur obligations in the form of grant agreements or other-
wise in amounts aggregating not to exceed $3'100,000,000.
This amount shall become available for obligation upon
the effective date of this subsection and shall remain available
until obligated.
There are authorized to be appropriated for liquidation of
the obligations incurred under this subsection not to exceed
$80,000,000 prior to July 1, 1971, which amount may be
increased to not to exceed an aggregate of $310,000,000 prior to
July 1, 1972, not to exceed an aggregate of $710,000,000 prior
to July 1, 1973; not to exceed an aggregate of $1,260,000,000
prior to July 1, 1974; not to exceed an aggregate of
$3,100,000,000 thereafter.9"
Although work still remained in getting the new mass transportation
legislation through Congress, Williams' amendment was the break-
collected to be used more broadly. This attitude was echoed, in part, by some members
of Congress who were unhappy at the relative loss of control over money when the trust
fund method was used. In short, seeing a fight ahead on the extension of their trust
fund, the highway people wanted the support of the urban constituency. See On the
Washington Scene, METROPOLITAN, Sept./Oct., 1969, at 36.
91. See Villarreal Answers Questions Aboit Nixon's Public Transportation Bill,
PASSENGER TRANSPORT, Sept. 12, 1969, at 1.
92. See Williams Named Man of the Year, PASSENGER TRANSPORT, Oct. 10, 1969,
at 1-2.
93. On the Washington Sceite, METROPOLITAN, Jan./Feb., 1970, at 29. This was.
changed in the final bill to read as follows:
Not to exceed $80,000,000 prior to July 1, 1971, which amount may be increased
to not to exceed an aggregate of $310,000,000 prior to July 1, 1972, not to exceed
an aggregate of $710,000,000 prior to July 1, 1973, not to exceed an aggregate of
$1,260,000,000 prior to July 1, 1974, not to exceed an aggregate of $1,860,000,000
prior to July 1, 1975, and not to exceed an aggregate of $3,100,000,000, thereafter.
H.R. 18185, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4c (1970).
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through. The next step was strengthening the coalition, carefully dealing
with key congressmen and putting together effective testimony to be
heard by the appropriate committees.9"
Meanwhile, the coalition was doing its work. It even began to
convince conservative legislators without big city constituencies. In
lobby effort and committee testimony it was pointed out repeatedly
that the mass transportation programs benefited not only large cities
but also the small towns in states with large nonurban populations.
Evidencing this value to smaller cities was the dispersion of funds
through the capital grant program. While the demonstration grants had
tended to be concentrated in the larger cities on the East and West coasts,
the capital grants and, to some extent, the technical study grants, had been
well distributed around the country.
Furthermore, the transit program was not only generally bene-
ficial but also fulfilled certain welfare needs. For instance, a congress-
man could claim to part of his constituens that the mass transportation
programs would take important steps in relieving highway congestion
so that his constituents could drive more easily. On the other hand, he
could also claim to low-income minority groups that improvements in
mass transportation would be highly beneficial to them by providing
the mobility necessary to reach jobs, places of medical care and so forth.
In a very real sense, backing transit could be construed as being all
things to all people.95
The work of the coalition began to succeed. The Senate passed the
bill with Williams' amendment by an 83 - 4 vote in February, 1970.
During the spring and summer of 1970 the coalition made a concerted
drive in the House. In September, the House passed the transit bill by a
vote of 327 - 16, and President Nixon signed the bill into law in
October. Without doubt a major victory was achieved for the cause of
urban mass transportation.98
94. Difficulties arose when the committee jurisdiction of the bills was questioned.
Transit legislation had always fallen to the House and Senate Committees on Banking
and Currency, which traditionally deaf with HUD matters. Although the mass trans-
portation programs had been shifted to DOT, the Banking and Currency committees
maintained that they still had jurisdiction. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee, which have jurisdiction over DOT
legislation, insisted that they should handle the transit programs. Both Banking and
Currency Committees held many firm supporters of transit legislation and to lose their
support on transit matters might raise serious difficulties. For the time being, at least,
the committee jurisdiction was not changed. What will happen in the future remains to
be seen. See On the Washington Scene, METROPOLITAN, Nov./Dec., 1969, at 44.
95. See "Damnedest Coalition' Fights for Transit Aid Bill Passage, PASSENGER
TRANSPORT, July 3, 1970, at 4-5.
96. See Senate Passes Transit Aid Bill, PASSENGER TRANSPORT, Feb. 6, 1970, at
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CONCLUSION
Some of the speeches made in the House on the occasion of the
passage of the 1970 Act reflect the attitude of Congress. One of the
clearest statements of the congressional attitude toward transit came
from Representative Patman, who said:
The transit industry has been the victim of the American
desire for the automobile so the public transportation has not
received much new capital and is now operating with old
equipment, old ideas, and, all too often, uninspired management
operating on the premise that their primary goal is to minimize
losses...
In view of the apparent local nature of the problems,
some people might wonder why the Federal Government should
undertake the vast responsibility of assisting communities in the
development of their public transportation service. The first and
most significant reason is the Federal interest in keeping the
cities of this country healthy . . . it is not only fair but
essential that we assist the cities in financing needed public
transportation service.
A second and perhaps less obvious reason is the funda-
mental federal interest in building up this local transportation
link which will enable other transportation modes to work
more effectively . . . 17
Clearly in one of the strange twists of politics, mass transportation
had become a safe issue. Supporting transit helped everyone. Interests
usually considered as competing with transit, such as the highway lobby,
came to realize that their interests, too, were furthered by the mass
transportation issue. The highway interests learned that they had to
lend their support or lose the vital backing of powerful, big city politicans,
and even small city politicans, in getting the highway trust fund renewed.
After almost ten years, the mass transportation programs of the
United States Government finally received the kind of funding necessary
to do an efficient job. However, the sums involved are still small con-
sidering the magnitude of the task. Furthermore, the transit trust fund
will probably become an issue again. The success of the trust fund, and
1, 6; Bill Passes, PAssNGER TRANSPORT, Oct. 2, 1970, at 1-7, 10-12; President Nixon
Signs Transit Aid Bill, PASsENGER TRANSPORT, OcT. 16, 1970, at 1.
97. 116 CoNG. REc. 9349 (1970).
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of all future transit programs, depends primarily on maintaining the
coalition that worked so well in 1969 and 1970.
There are some who doubt whether the many segments of our society
can work together. Only the self-deceived can deny that the republic is
suffering from internal problems and disaffections unique since the
Civil War. One thing is certain, however. Much of the dissension is a
product of urbanization carried out in a manner which is debilitating
and demoralizing. If the nation's problems are focused on its cities,
they are also likely to be solved there. The shot in the arm given mass
transportation in 1970 should help make the process of providing livable
cities a little easier.
